Ask HN: Why there are no cryptographic bolt-seals?
I just saw a documentary on coke traffic in France. A lot a coke comes via containers from Colombia. One of the problems is that the bolt-seals that seal the containers can be faked (serial number). Thus, the end to end chain can not be guaranteed. To me, a cryptographic bolt-seal could be a very good option. The idea is that upon closure of the seal, a crypto pair is generated in it. Then, the public key is scanned (RFID) and thus becomes the serial number of the seal. The serial number is timestamped and published. Once upon arrival, the customs or the client can check that the seal was not tampered with by public-key cryptography. All the generated public keys would then be stored on an open database, thus making it impossible to reuse the same seal twice (or by having faked seals). What do you think of it ? 0 comments on Hacker News.
I just saw a documentary on coke traffic in France. A lot a coke comes via containers from Colombia. One of the problems is that the bolt-seals that seal the containers can be faked (serial number). Thus, the end to end chain can not be guaranteed. To me, a cryptographic bolt-seal could be a very good option. The idea is that upon closure of the seal, a crypto pair is generated in it. Then, the public key is scanned (RFID) and thus becomes the serial number of the seal. The serial number is timestamped and published. Once upon arrival, the customs or the client can check that the seal was not tampered with by public-key cryptography. All the generated public keys would then be stored on an open database, thus making it impossible to reuse the same seal twice (or by having faked seals). What do you think of it ?
I just saw a documentary on coke traffic in France. A lot a coke comes via containers from Colombia. One of the problems is that the bolt-seals that seal the containers can be faked (serial number). Thus, the end to end chain can not be guaranteed. To me, a cryptographic bolt-seal could be a very good option. The idea is that upon closure of the seal, a crypto pair is generated in it. Then, the public key is scanned (RFID) and thus becomes the serial number of the seal. The serial number is timestamped and published. Once upon arrival, the customs or the client can check that the seal was not tampered with by public-key cryptography. All the generated public keys would then be stored on an open database, thus making it impossible to reuse the same seal twice (or by having faked seals). What do you think of it ? 0 comments on Hacker News.
I just saw a documentary on coke traffic in France. A lot a coke comes via containers from Colombia. One of the problems is that the bolt-seals that seal the containers can be faked (serial number). Thus, the end to end chain can not be guaranteed. To me, a cryptographic bolt-seal could be a very good option. The idea is that upon closure of the seal, a crypto pair is generated in it. Then, the public key is scanned (RFID) and thus becomes the serial number of the seal. The serial number is timestamped and published. Once upon arrival, the customs or the client can check that the seal was not tampered with by public-key cryptography. All the generated public keys would then be stored on an open database, thus making it impossible to reuse the same seal twice (or by having faked seals). What do you think of it ?
Hacker News story: Ask HN: Why there are no cryptographic bolt-seals?
Reviewed by Tha Kur
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November 02, 2018
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